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Reconsidering CERCLA Retroactivity After
Landgraf v USI Film Products
Nicole M. McGinnist
Congress hurriedly enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA7)1 in
the closing days of a lame-duck Congress and in the wake of the
Love Canal and Valley of the Drums scandals. Unfortunately, the
haste led to more than much-needed legislation: it led to the
enactment of a confusing bill whose provisions would be hotly
contested and difficult to interpret. After a decade and a half of
interpretation and application of CERCLA, new confusion exists
concerning the reach of the statute's provisions mandating the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and recovery of response costs
from polluters. Until recently, courts agreed that the government
and private parties could use CERCLA to impose liability retroactively.2 Lower federal courts consistently held that Section
107(a),' which makes individuals involved in the release of
hazardous substances liable for response costs of the cleanup,
applies to the disposal of toxic waste prior to CERCLA's enactment.4
In 1994, the Supreme Court articulated its standards for
retroactive application of statutes in Landgraf v USI Film Products,' arguably changing the accepted analytical framework for
determining whether to apply a statute retroactively. Landgraf
requires a second look at CERCLA's application. The principles
enunciated in Landgrafmay leave CERCLA vulnerable to important challenges as to its previously assumed retroactive application. On this basis, a federal district court in Alabama recently
t A.B. 1995, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Chicago.
Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (1980), codified at 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1994).
2 See Gould, Inc. v A & M Battery & Tire Service, 933 F Supp 431, 438 (M D Pa
1996) (stating that only one federal district court in the history of CERCLA's existence

had not applied CERCLA provisions retroactively).
94 Stat at 2781, codified at 42 USC § 9607(a). Commentators commonly refer to
CERCLA provisions by their sections in the original act. To maintain consistency, I will
do so as well in the text. Hereinafter, all citations in the notes will be to the codification

for ease of reference.
See, for example, Brown v Georgeoff, 562 F Supp 1300, 1302-14 (N D Ohio 1983).
' 511 US 244 (1994).
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declined to apply CERCLA liability retroactively." Although the
Eleventh Circuit recently overturned the Alabama district court's
decision,' the lower court's retroactivity analysis presented
compelling arguments that may foster new confusion and
dissensus among the courts.
Retroactive statutes are disfavored in the United States, as
evidenced by constitutional provisions such as the Due Process
Clause,8 the Takings Clause," and the prohibition of ex post
facto laws.1" When no clear evidence of congressional intent
exists to the contrary, courts must presume that laws do not
apply retroactively. 1 CERCLA contains no express provision
requiring retroactive application of response costs, and the
legislative history is ambiguous, with no committee or conference
reports to guide interpreters. 2 While the Alabama district court
decision was an outlier and has been reversed by the Eleventh
Circuit, it raises serious issues that the courts need to address.
Courts should not sidestep their judicial obligation under
Landgrafto scrutinize retroactive statutory provisions.
This Comment will argue that courts may not apply
CERCLA retroactively. Part I outlines the caselaw applying
Section 107 prior to the 1994 Landgrafdecision. Part II explains
the holding of Landgraf and recent judicial opinions that consider
CERCLA liability in light of Landgraf.Finally, Part III discusses
the implications of Landgraf for interpreting CERCLA in the
future.
I. CERCLA CASELAW PRIOR To LANDGRAF v USI FILM
PRODUCTS
Until recently, federal courts consistently have applied
CERCLA liability retroactively, imposing liability upon those

United States v Olin Corp., 927 F Supp 1502 (S D Ala 1996).
United States v Olin Corp., 107 F3d 1506 (11th Cir 1997).
US Const, Amend V; US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
US Const, Amend V.
1o US Const, Art I, § 9, cl 3; US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 1.
See, for example, KaiserAluminum & Chemical Corp. v Bonjorno, 494 US 827, 84244, 855-56 (1990) (Scalia concurring); Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital, 488 US
204, 208 (1988); United States v Heth, 7 US (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) (Cushing Opinion).
But see Bradley v School Board of Richmond, 416 US 696 (1974).
12 See United States v Price, 577 F Supp 1103, 1109 (D NJ 1989); Georgeoff, 562
F
Supp at 1311 (stating that "the precise issue of retroactivity... was not addressed in the
Congressional debates"); Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the
Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?,20 Harv
Envir L Rev 199, 272 (1996).
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involved with the disposal of hazardous wastes long before the
enactment of the statute in 1980. While courts consistently have
applied CERCLA retroactively, their rationales for doing so have
been inconsistent. Courts have articulated multiple reasons, in
different combinations, for applying CERCLA retroactively.
A. Liability for Parties Responsible for Waste Sites Created
Prior to the Enactment of CERCLA is Not Retroactive Liability.
One rationale adopted in support of pre-enactment liability is
that CERCLA response costs may be imposed retroactively because the costs are not, in fact, retroactive." While the conduct
that leads to the liability may have occurred before the enactment, the harm still exists post-enactment, much like a case of a
continuing nuisance. CERCLA is not retroactive because it governs, in a sense, current wrongs. As one court put it, "A statute
that attaches liability to present conditions stemming from past
acts does not necessarily have retroactive effects ....
The argument that CERCLA is not retroactive because it
remedies current and continuing harms has not been widely
followed. Only one court has adopted this view. 5
B. CERCLA'S Language Evidences Congressional Intent to
Reach Pre-Enactment Conduct
Courts use two textual arguments to support the retroactive
application of CERCLA. First, courts argue that the language of'
CERCLA includes past tense verbs and conditions, and therefore
covers past actions. Second, courts offer an argument based on
negative' implication: because the CERCLA provisions dealing
with natural resources contain express statements that they do
not apply retroactively,"6 the remainder of the CERCLA provisions which lack such prospective-only statements cannot be
similarly limited.
The first textual argument courts make in support of retroactive application of CERCLA is that the use of the past tense in

See United States v South CarolinaRecycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F Supp 984,
997-98 (D SC 1984) (holding, in the alternative, that even if the statute were considered
to be retroactive, the statute would satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process).
13

1, Id at 996.
II

Id at 984.

42 USC §§ 9607(f), 9611(d)(1).
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the statute shows congressional intent to reach pre-enactment
conduct.17 The Eighth Circuit has noted,
it is manifestly clear that Congress intended CERCLA
to have retroactive effect. The language used in the key
liability provision, CERCLA § 107, ... refers to actions
and conditions in the past tense: 'any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substances owned or
operated,' 'any person who... arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal,' and 'any person
who.., accepted any hazardous substances for trans18

port ....

Courts have been ambivalent regarding how much weight to
accord the past-tense verbs, 9 however, and Section 107(a)(4)
seems to require prospective-only application through its use of
the verb "shall."0 Furthermore, Section 107(a)(3) indicates retroactive-only application, making one who "arranged" but not "arranges" for disposal liable for response costs,2 1 an effect Congress surely did not intend. Due to the inconsistency of verb tenses in Section 107's language, courts are uncomfortable relying on
verb tense to decide whether to apply CERCLA retroactively. As
one court noted, the past-tense and future-tense verb arguments
"in effect [] cancel each other."22 The court thus concluded that
"congressional intent to either impose or withhold liability for
response costs incurred before CERCLA cannot be divined from
the verb tenses in § 107(a)."2 3 Ultimately, courts tend to de-emphasize the verb-tense argument, but they like to mention it
nonetheless.
Courts also make a textual argument based on negative
implication in order to justify imposing retroactive liability despite the lack of an express provision in the statute. Section

See, for example, United States v Northeastern Pharmaceutical& Chemical Co.,
Inc., 810 F2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir 1986).
"SId (citations omitted).
'9 United States v Shell Oil Co., 605 F Supp 1064, 1073 (D Colo 1985); Brown v.
Georgeoff,562 F Supp 1300, 1310 (N D Ohio 1983).
20 Section 107(aX4) provides that "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
17

substances ...

shall be liable. ..

."

42 USC § 9607(a)(4). See also Shell Oil, 605 F Supp at

1073.
21 Section 107(aX3) holds liable "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances . . . ." 42 USC § 9607(a)(3).
23 Shell Oil, 605 F Supp at 1073.
23 Id.
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107(a) mentions no time limitations on recovery of response costs,
while Sections 107(f) and 111(d) allow liability for natural resource damages to attach only to acts occurring after the enactment of CERCLA.' Because Section 107(a) includes no such
limiting provision, courts argue that Congress did not intend to
limit its reach to post-enactment conduct. If CERCLA provisions
that are silent as to retroactivity are already limited in their
application, then "the limiting provisions of Sections 107(f) and
111(d) would be mere surplusage. In order to give meaning to
these provisions, one must assume that liability for other damages... is not so limited."' Similarly, Congress, knowing of the
presumption against retroactivity in statutory interpretation,
included the prospective-only limitation in Sections 107(f) and
111(d) because the presumption against retroactivity had been
rebutted in the remainder of the statute's provisions."
C. Retroactivity by Reason of CERCLA's Legislative History and
Purpose
When references to the textual provisions of the statute do
not resolve ambiguity, courts often turn to legislative history.
Looking at the stated purpose and scheme of CERCLA, the
courts typically find clear congressional intent that the statute be
applied retroactively. Nevertheless, courts admit that "[t]he legislative history of CERCLA is very difficult to follow."2 7
Relatedly, courts also claim that applying CERCLA retroactively more fully vindicates the remedial purpose behind the
statute. Considering the amount of money in the Superfund established to clean up disposal sites," courts argue that congressional intent to clean up sites already in existence could not be
satisfied only by using Superfund money; therefore, private party
pre-enactment liability is required." According to this argument, CERCLA's underlying purpose would not be fulfilled unless
courts impose retroactive liability upon private parties.'

Compare 42 USC § 9607(a) with 42 USC §§ 9607(f), 9611(d).
Shell Oil, 605 F Supp at 1076.
2' Id at 1075-76.
27 Northeastern Pharmaceutical,810 F2d at 737.
'

See 42 USC § 9604(cX3). The "Superfund" is a trust fund, initially totalling $1.6

billion, designated to pay cleanup costs where responsible parties could not.

' See Georgeoff, 562 F Supp at 1313 ("At the time CERCLA was enacted, Congress
was aware that the costs of the clean up [sic] it envisioned would greatly exceed the
amount of the Superfund.")
" Id.
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II. LANDGRAF V USI FILM PRODUCTS AND ITS EFFECT ON
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CERCLA LIABILITY
A. The Reasoning of Landgrafv USI Film Products
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided Landgraf v USI Film
Products,1 a Title VII sexual harassment suit. While dismissal
of the plaintiffs Title VII claim was pending on appeal before the
Fifth Circuit, President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which allowed new remedies for Title VII plaintiffs.3 2 Now, besides equitable relief, plaintiffs could recover punitive and compensatory damages for a Title VII violation, as well as have their
suit heard before a jury. In Landgraf,the Supreme Court had to
decide between two competing canons of construction: "the rule
that 'a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision;'"33 or the interpretive axiom that "'congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have
retroactive effect unless their language requires the result."
The Court admitted that earlier Supreme Court precedent may
have been ambiguous on what interpretive default rule to apply
when there is no express congressional guidance in either a
statute's text or legislative history." With the hope of providing
better guidance, however, the Court set out a clear default rule
for courts to follow when there exists no clear evidence of congressional intent for retroactive application of a statute: a presumption in favor of non-retroactivity.3 6
The petitioner in Landgrafrelied on the effective date provision of the 1991 Act as one indicator of congressional intent to
apply the statute retroactively. The effective date provision of the
1991 Act, Section 402(a), states, "Except as otherwise specifically
provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall
take effect upon enactment."37 The petitioner pointed to Sections
109(c) and 402(b) that specifically provide for prospective application.3" Relying upon two canons of construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius and the canon against surplusage, the peti-

'

511 US 244 (1994).

12

Pub L No 102-66, 105 Stat 1071 (1991), codified at 42 USC § 1981 et seq (1994).

33 Landgraf,511 US at 264, quoting Bradley v School Board of Richmond, 416 US
696, 711 (1974).
34 Id, quoting Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital, 488 US 204, 208 (1988).
3'

Id at 261.

~'Id at 280.

36 105 Stat
at 1099.

§ 109(c), 105 Stat at 1078; § 402(b), 105 Stat at 1099.
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tioner argued that the clause "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically
provided" must refer to Section 109(c) and 402(b), or else it would
be mere surplusage."9 Moreover, because Congress carved out
specific instances when the statute would apply prospectively, the
petitioner urged the court to assume that the remainder of the
provisions would apply retroactively.'
The Court found both of the petitioner's arguments unpersuasive. First, the Court found that the effective date provision is
"most unlikely... to carry the critically important meaning
petitioner assigns to it," because Congress has demonstrated in
the past that it knows how to specifically reach pre-enactment
conduct when it chooses to do so. The Court cited Congress's
amendment of Title VII in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, where Congress provided, "'The Amendments...
shall be applicable with respect to charges pending with the
Commission on the date of enactment ...

." 41

The Court found

it more likely that the "except as otherwise specifically provided"
clause was inserted as a precaution
to "avoid the risk of an inad42
vertent conflict in the statute."
Second, regarding the expressio unius argument, the Court

looked to legislative history and found that statements made by
legislators "cannot plausibly be read as reflecting any general
agreement."48 Furthermore, a previous bill introduced in the
House contained express retroactivity provisions, but the provisions were taken out in the Senate substitute bill." In the
wake of such "positive inaction" in the legislature, the fact that
Congress included prospective-only provisions does not evince
any general agreement about the retroactivity issue.
Landgraf held that without clear evidence or expression of
intent, federal statutes shall not be applied retroactively. 45 The
majority opinion looked for a clear expression of intent in both
the express language of the statute and the legislative history.'
The Court stated that "a requirement that Congress first make
its intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has deter3 511 US at 259-60.
40 Id.

41 Id at 258 n 10, quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 14, Pub L No
92-261, 86 Stat 113.
42

Id at 260.

511 US at 262.
"

Id.

41 Id at 280.
'6 See id at 263 n 15, for an example of the Landgraf Court's consideration of legislative history as a source for finding congressional intent.
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mined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for
disruption or unfairness."47
The Court reconciled its prior ambiguous caselaw by drawing
some distinctions between procedural rights and private, vested,
substantive rights. In the case of procedural rights, the Court
stated that there are "diminished reliance interests" and the
procedural rule will only affect "secondary conduct," and therefore the presumption against retroactivity does not apply.' A
rule affecting secondary conduct lacks the inherent unfairness of
a rule affecting primary conduct, so there is less need for a presumption against retroactivity. In order for a statute to trigger
the presumption against retroactivity, it must be retroactive in
its effect; a statute is not considered retroactive "merely because
it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the
statute's enactment."' 9
The Landgraf Court defined retroactive effect as a situation
where the statute "would impair rights a party possessed when
he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose
new duties with respect to transactions already completed." 0
The Court found that despite the fact that the 1991 Act "does not
make unlawful conduct that was lawful when it occurred,"5 1 the
Act does "attach an important new legal burden," thus invoking
the presumption against retroactivity.5 2
Three justices would make the standard for applying a statute retroactively even more stringent, thus heightening the presumption against retroactivity. In a concurring opinion, three
justices disagreed with the relaxed majority standard and instead
would have required that the statutory text itself evince a "clear
statement" of retroactive application."
The Supreme Court recently clarified Landgraf in Lindh v.
Murphy. 4 Lindh held that courts first must use traditional
rules of statutory construction to determine whether a statute
applies to pending cases and has retroactive effect.55 If, after
employing canons of construction and other tools of interpreta-

'7

511 US at 268.

4

Id at 275.

" Id at 269.
50 Id at 280.
"

511 US at 281-82.

52

Id.
Id at 286-88 (Scalia concurring).

'4 117 S Ct 2059 (1997).

" Id at 2063.
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tion, a court finds a statute to have a retroactive effect, then the
Landgrafdefault rule applies."
B. Landgrafv USI Film Products in the CERCLA Context
In the wake of Landgraf, there have been numerous challenges in federal district courts to the retroactive application of'
CERCLA57 liability. While one case simply relies upon pre-existing caselaw and omits any independent analysis,5 8 other courts
have acknowledged the importance of Landgraffor judicial interpretation and have employed a Landgraf-basedanalysis in reach5 9
ing their decision that CERCLA still applies retroactively.
These courts, however, followed without much modification the
same textual and legislative history rationales as the preLandgrafcourts.
CERCLA retroactivity caselaw since Landgraf mirrors the
pre-Landgrafcaselaw: courts almost unanimously conclude that
retroactive application is appropriate, but they are unable to
agree upon a rationale for that conclusion. A federal district court
in Nevada based its decision to apply CERCLA retroactively on
the negative implication argument, holding that the express
requirement that Sections 107(f) and 111(d) be applied prospectively would be wasted verbiage unless the other provisions were
to be applied retroactively.' The Nevada court discounted the
past tense language argument and brushed aside the remedial
purpose canon."1 An Eastern District of Tennessee court referred.
to CERCLA's past tense language, the negative inference argument, and, as the dispositive factor, the necessity of retroactivity
to vindicate Congress's intent to clean up inactive waste sites. 1
Another district court opinion referred to past tense language
and to congressional intent to clean up inactive sites but failed to

Id.
42 USC § 9601 et seq (1994).
See Gould Inc. v A & M Battery & Tire Service, 933 F Supp 431, 438 (M D Pa
1996) (stating that, although in May 1996, one district court decided that retroactive
application is incorrect, "we are unpersuaded by a single.., case which is surrounded 1r
a myriad of opinions that apply CERCLA retroactively, either directly or implicitly").
" See Cooper Industries,Inc. v Agway, Inc., 1996 WL 550128, *6-*10 (N D.NY); Nova
Chemicals, Inc. v Gaf Corp., 945 F Supp 1098, 1100-05 (E D Tenn 1996); Nevada Department of Transportationv United States, 925 F Supp 691, 693-96 (D Nev 1996) ("Nevada
DOT).
Nevada DOT, 925 F Supp at 701-02.
SI Id at 699-700.
62 Nova Chemicals, 945 F Supp at 1103-05.
17

'
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mention the negative implication argument.' Landgraf requires
clear evidence of intent from Congress before a statute will apply
retroactively, but these district court decisions demonstrate that
judges are unclear as to which approach provides the requisite
evidence of congressional intent to apply CERCLA retroactively.
In a thoughtful departure from the traditional rationales,
one recent federal district court decision, United States v Olin
Corp., disagreed with all earlier CERCLA precedents and refused
to apply CERCLA retroactively." The Olin district court dismissed the pre-Landgraf cases as outdated under the new
Landgraf analysis. The court pointed to parallels between
CERCLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, including: the lack of
a clear statutory expression of retroactivity;6 5 the confusing and
contradictory legislative histories;' and the necessarily retroactive impact of the statutes if applied to pre-enactment conduct.6 7
Using the Landgraf test, the Olin district court could not find
clear evidence of congressional intent that CERCLA's Section 107
be applied retroactively." The district court therefore concluded
that the presumption against retroactive application still controlled. 9
A unanimous panel of three judges reversed the Olin district
court.70 The Eleventh Circuit agreed that CERCLA "contains no
explicit statement regarding retroactive application of its cleanup
liability provisions," 71 but found clear congressional intent favoring retroactive application based upon the following factors: pasttense verbs in Section 107(a)(2);72 language in Section 103 providing that those who owned or operated a hazardous waste facility prior to CERCLA's effective date notify the Environmental
Protection Agency of pre-enactment conduct or forfeit any defenses to liability;7" the need for retroactivity in order to vindicate

Cooper Industries, 1996 WL 550128 at *9.
927 F Supp 1502 (S D Ala 1996).
Id at 1512-13.

Id at 1513-15.
Id at 1515-16.
" 927 F Supp at 1516.
66

61

69 Id.

7o United States v Olin Corp., 107 F3d 1505 (11th Cir 1997).
7' Id at 1513.
72 Id at 1513.
7' Id at 1513. Section 103(c) provides,
Within one hundred and eighty days after December 11, 1980, any person who
owns or operates or who at the time of disposal owned or operated, or who accepted hazardous substances for transport and selected, a facility at which hazardous substances ... are or have been stored, treated, or disposed of shall,
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the statute's purpose;74 and legislative history in the form of a
Senate bill referring to pre-enactment liability, whose cleanup
provisions were later adopted into CERCLA
The Eleventh Circuit did, in fact, find congressional evidence
supporting retroactive liability; the Eleventh Circuit did not,,
however, find clear congressional evidence. For example, if the
Eleventh Circuit wishes to accord such importance to verb tenses
in the liability provisions, then it must address the fact that
Section 107(a)(3) imposes liability upon those who "arranged" for
disposal or treatment of hazardous waste, but not those who
arrange to do so in the future.7" In fact, the Nevada DOT court,
which agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in its conclusion, stated
that "the occasional use of past verb tenses ... is a thin reed on
which to support congressional intent to apply CERCLA retroactively."77 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit failed to address
aspects of CERCLA's legislative history that indicate Congress
did not intend liability to apply retroactively, such as the deletion
of an express
retroactivity provision from an early version of
7
CERCLA. 8
III. LOOKING AT CERCLA LIABILITY AFTER LANDGRAF: BACK TO
THE BASICS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE END OF
JUDICIAL LEGISLATING
The best judicial construction of CERCLA liability, in light of
the recent Landgraf opinion, denies retroactive application.
Landgraf breathes new air into the traditional presumption
against retroactivity and checks judicial wanderings into the
margins of the legislative arena. Courts should look more to the
text and legislative history of the statute and less to its own
desire to enforce the statute's purposes most efficaciously.

unless such facility has a permit... or has been accorded interim status...
notify the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency of the existence of such facility, specifying the amount and type of any hazardous substance to be found there, and any known, suspected, or likely releases of such
substances from such facility.... [Any... person who knowingly fails to provide the notice required by this subsection shall not be entitled to any limitation
of liability or to any defenses to liability set out in section 9607 of this title ....
42 USC §.9603(c).
7 107 F3d at 1514.
7' Id at 1514.
76 See text accompanying note 21.
" 925 F Supp at 699.
71 See text accompanying notes 93-94.
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The judiciary can only enforce laws that have undergone the
legislative process laid out in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, and should not enforce a purpose that is not written into
such duly-enacted legislation. When a court reads retroactivity
into a statute in order to vindicate what it perceives to be the
statute's purpose, the court enters the realm of legislating that is
constitutionally reserved for Congress. To enforce a law, Congress
may allow a federal agency to promulgate regulations pursuant
to legislation, but courts lack such authority and may not act as
pseudo-administrative agencies, creating their own framework for
vindicating a congressional purpose. Doing so would violate the
principle of separation of powers.7"
A. The Application of Landgrafs Analyticai Framework to
CERCLA's Provisions
Landgraf articulated a framework for courts to follow in
deciding whether to apply a statute retroactively, once a court
makes the initial determination that a statute potentially has a
retroactive effect.80 First, courts should determine whether an
express textual provision describes the statute's reach. If no express provision does so, then, under Lindh v. Murphy, the court
must use canons of statutory construction and other interpretive
aids. s" Using these tools of statutory construction, the court
should determine whether the statute has a retroactive effect. If
the statute unavoidably has retroactive effect, the court should
find against retroactivity unless there is clear congressional intent in favor of such a result.
As explained below, all agree that CERCLA would have a
retroactive effect if applied to pre-enactment conduct. Courts
then must decide whether to enforce retroactive application.
Applying a Landgraf analysis, as the Olin district court did,
leads to the conclusion that Congress only arguably intended
CERCLA to be retroactive, and an arguable intent is not "clear
congressional intent." CERCLA lacks an express retroactivity
provision, so the courts must determine if other congressional
sources indicate a clear expression of intent to apply Section 107
retroactively.

"' See Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 163 (George Bell and Sons 1909)
("Were the (judiciary] joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would
be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator.")
8o 511 US 244, 280 (1994).
"

117 S Ct 2059, 2063 (1997).

507]

CERCLA RETROACTIMTY

1. CERCLA is a retroactive statute and therefore the
Landgraf framework for interpretingstatutes applies.
As a threshold determination, a court first must decide
whether CERCLA may have a retroactive effect. While the court
in United States v South Carolina Recycling & Disposal argued
that CERCLA may not be retroactive, 2 no other courts have
followed South Carolina Recycling's premise that CERCLA is
prospective in its application. The lack of support may be because
following this approach would render all laws prospective in the
same sense. CERCLA has retroactive effect because the statute
increases a party's liability ex post. A party who arranged for
disposal of hazardous waste before the enactment of CERCLA,
when such disposal was entirely legal, must now pay damages for
that pre-enactment conduct." In fact, CERCLA offends the presumption against retroactivity even more than the 1991 Civil
Rights Act at issue in Landgraf. While the 1991 Act merely attached new damages to already illegal acts," CERCLA, if applied retroactively, would make previously legal conduct illegal. Moreover, the Landgraf Court's distinction between procedural and
substantive legislation would work in favor of prospectivity in
this case, because new liability is not even arguably procedural.
2. The past tense language in CERCLA fails to provide clear
evidence of congressional intent to apply Section 107
retroactively.
Because the text does not contain an express provision that
CERCLA be applied retroactively, courts should first look to
other textual evidence for clear indications of congressional intent. The use of past tense verbs, although frequently cited for
support, has also been found largely inconclusive by courts." As
the Nevada Departmentof Transportationv United States ("Nevada DOT") court explained, "the better view is to ignore verb tenses within CERCLA's test for purposes of discerning congressional
intent."86 The court went on to explain that a change in the
653 F Supp 984, 996 (D SC 1984).
See United States v Alcan Aluminum Corp., 1996 US Dist LEXIS 16358, at *7 (N
D NY) (noting CERCLA's reputation as a "leviathan," mostly due to the "seemingly
boundless retroactive effect that the statute presents to a party").
See text accompanying notes 51-52.
See, for example, United States v Northeastern Pharmaceutical& Chemical Co.,
Inc., 810 F2d 726, 735 (8th Cir 1986), adopting the reasoning in United States v Shell Oil
Co., 605 F Supp 1064 (D Colo, 1985); Brown v Georgeoff, 562 F Supp 1300, 1309-11 (N D
Ohio 1983).
86 925 F Supp 691, 699 (D Nev 1996).
'3
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phrase "any person who accepts any hazardous substances," late
in the Senate's crafting of the bill, to "accepts or accepted" went
"'unnoticed-hardly the response which would be expected if
Congress attached any significance to the addition.'

7

3. The negative implication argument parallels a similar
argument rejected by the Landgraf Court.
The negative implication argument provides another textual
ground for the imposition of retroactive liability: because Congress specifically limited damages to natural resources to prospective-only liability," one can infer that Congress intended
the other liability provisions to be unlimited. This argument is
difficult to maintain in light of Landgraf, however, since the
Landgraf court rejected a similar argument. In Landgraf, the
plaintiff argued that "because Congress provided specifically for
prospectivity in two places, we should infer that it intended the
opposite for the remainder of the statute.""' The Court responded that if Congress had intended such a "determinate meaning,"
it could have spelled it out with express language to that effect. 90
The Nevada DOT court distinguished between the prospective-only sections of the two statutes, suggesting that,
[w]hile the Supreme Court in Landgraf 'would be
surprised' if Congress had intended the 1991 Act to
apply retroactively through negative inference.., it is
not at all surprising that CERCLA's liability provisions
would [be] limited to prospective application as to natural resource damages, without being so limited as to
response costs. 1
Natural resource damages are arguably distinct from response
costs because they apply to stable sites that are not continuing to
deteriorate. 92 On the other hand, the two provisions in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 providing for prospectivity were also distinct
from the rest of the bill. Congress meant one section "to exempt a
single disparate impact lawsuit against the Wards Cove Packing

Id, quoting Georgeoff, 562 F Supp at 1309-10 and referring to 42 USC § 9607(aX4).
42 USC §§ 9607(f), 9611(d).
511 US at 259 (citations omitted).
'0 Id.
" 925 F Supp at 702.
'7

"

'2

Id.
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Company"
and the other section referred only to overseas employ9
ers.

4. The removal of an express retroactivity provision in a
CERCLA draft evinces a lack of congressional intent to apply
liability retroactively.
Another argument, based upon the legislative history of
CERCLA, provides another Landgraf parallel and tends to support non-retroactive application of CERCLA liability. Like the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, a draft version of the CERCLA bill contained an express retroactivity provision that later was deleted.
Section 3072 of the original version of HR 7020, provided an
express retroactivity provision applicable to the entire statute.4
The deletion of this provision supports the proposition that Congress did not intend for the statute to be retroactive, or at least
that it was not sure it wanted such an effect.
In Landgraf, an explicit retroactivity provision found in the
original House bill, was deleted from the agreed-upon Senate
substitute bill. The Landgrafcourt stated, referring to the Civil
Rights Act, that "the history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression that legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to
what extent the Act would apply to pre-enactment conduct.""5
The deletion of Section 3072 from CERCLA seems to indicate, at
minimum, a similar lack of clear congressional intent regarding
retroactivity.
5. The legislative history is ambiguous and unreliable.
A further look at legislative history provides no clear evidence in favor of retroactive application. The last-minute enactment of the statute makes its legislative history untrustworthy.
Furthermore, there are no committee reports, which usually
provide a determinative indicator of legislative history. As Senator Stafford explained after the passage of CERCLA, "[T]he floor
statements which are most relevant are those of the bill's draft.ers, including myself .... Frankly, in the confusion which surrounded those final days, I may have slipped up once or twice."9'3

Landgraf, 511 US at 257-58.
94 HIR 7020, § 3072, 96th Cong, 2d Seas (April 2, 1980) (original slip bill), read, "The
provisions of this subpart... shall apply to releases of hazardous waste without regard t)
whether or not such releases occurred before, or occur on or after, the date of the enact93

ment. .. "

511 US at 262-63.
127 Cong Rec S 19778 (Sept 9, 1981) (statement of Senator Stafford).
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Senator Stafford went on to admit that, in the case of joint and
several liability, the statute intentionally was left with gaps for
the courts to fill in, "We left development of the [liability] concept
and its application to the courts and the common law. 8 7 Under
a dynamic statutory interpretation, courts might view CERCLA
as a common law type of statute, designed for judicial gap-filling.
On the other hand, if the legislators admit that they left
gaps, then the amount of legislative deliberation and decision
becomes suspect. A statute with a legislative history that openly
admits ambiguity and a desire for courts to resolve acknowledged
and anticipated interpretive problems cannot speak with resonating authority on the important issue of retroactivity. To rely
upon a rushed legislative process with a confusing legislative history is to rely upon something other than "clear evidence of congressional intent" and would be untrue to Landgraf.
Court's have overlooked a final indicator of congressional
ambiguity: the presence of a legislative veto in CERCLA as originally enacted. 8 The veto provided that if the legislature did not
approve of the regulations promulgated pursuant to CERCLA,
then one house of Congress could veto the regulations. When the
Supreme Court found the legislative veto unconstitutional in INS
9 9 the veto was
v Chadha,
severed from CERCLA. The presence
of a legislative veto in CERCLA may provide some insight into
Congress' intent at the time of enactment. The enacting Congress, thinking that it would have leeway to tailor the enforcement of CERCLA according to its developing intent, might
have been more specific in drafting its legislation if it knew that
it would not have such discretion in the future. A one-house
legislative veto provided the enacting Congress with room to
leave gaps in the statute, because legislators thought they could
"fix" anything later.
6. Relying upon CERCLA's remedialpurpose is not sufficient
to impose liability retroactively.
The remedial, backward-looking nature of CERCLA and the
fact that retroactive application best effectuates the purpose of
the statute do not justify the imposition of retroactive liability on
private parties. That the statute arguably is remedial in its purpose is not conclusive. Even if the statute could be classified as

Id.

42 USC § 9655.

9 462 US 919 (1983).
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'remedial,' such a classification does not indicate clear congressional intent that the statute be retroactive, especially when the
remedy involves damages for a previously legal act.
Moreover, CERCLA is far from unequivocally being remedial.
While Nevada DOT allowed retroactive application, it explained
that "CERCLA... is not merely 'remedial."' The district,
court in United States v Olin Corp. stated the situation more
emphatically, "Legislation cannot be remedial if the conduct.
being 'remedied' was lawful at the time of its occurrence."10 '
While the response costs are not technically punishment, thereby
sidestepping any constitutional claim a party might make regarding ex post facto laws, they still violate fundamental concepts of
fairness and notice. The retroactive application of CERCLA liability disrupts "settled expectations" by disallowing individuals "an.
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly." 2 CERCLA punishes those who, at the time
of its enactment, had committed no legal wrong. There exists no
case "in which Congress had not clearly spoken," where the Su-preme Court has "read a statute substantially increasing the
monetary liability of a private party to apply to conduct occurring
before the statute's enactment.""° If the Supreme Court ad.heres to this line of precedent, then it will not read CERCLA to
apply to pre-enactment conduct, as CERCLA unquestionably
imposes significant monetary liability.
The underlying purpose of CERCLA should not be dispositive
of whether to impose retroactive liability. As the Court said in
Landgraf,"It will frequently be true.., that retroactive applica.tion of a new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully. That
consideration, however, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption
against retroactivity." 4 Congress did not necessarily intend
CERCLA to impose liability on polluters retroactively. An alternative intent, such as the desire to impose liability upon those
who were improperly disposing of hazardous wastes at the time
of CERCLA's enactment and thereafter, is entirely plausible.
Making the polluter pay may very reasonably mean requiring
only current and post-enactment polluters pay.

925 F Supp at 700.
'10927 F Supp 1502, 1517-18 (S D Ala 1996).
100

-o

Landgraf,511 US at 265.

'3

Id at 284.

'o'Id at 285-86.
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B. The Judiciary Must Conform to Its Role as Interpreter and
not Maker of the Laws
The Landgraf Court, in warning courts to refrain from construing a statute retroactively merely to vindicate its purpose
more fully, made a statement about judicial legislation. A judge
should not decide the purpose of legislation, only to then interpret the statute so as to effect his or her idea of the statute's
purpose; to do so would violate of the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. Delegating to the judiciary the decision
whether to apply CERCLA retroactively might have fallen within
the constitutionally allowable framework if Congress first had
established a general standard and then allowed courts to tailor
the liability on a case-by-case, fact-dependent basis. Courts are in
the best position to resolve issues based on fact-intensive inquiries, not to decide levels of liability that will apply across many
fact situations. Courts may have honorable intentions in their
desire to punish those who harm the country's environmental
welfare, but if those acts were entirely legal when committed,
and Congress has not clearly declared that liability will be imposed retroactively, then courts have no choice but to only apply
liability prospectively. A court that chooses otherwise sits as a
super-legislature and violates the principle of separation of powers, in express disregard of the LandgrafCourt's instructions.
That Congress did not include an express retroactive liability
provision in CERCLA, and, in fact, deleted such a provision from
a House version of the bill, provides legislative history for the
courts to interpret. Laurence Tribe points out that silence may
function as a part of the historical context of the legislation's
enactment, and suggests that "Congress' prior or contemporaneous rejection of ... legislation that would have enacted the very
interpretation of a statute that a litigant later claims a statute
did enact" is a "[c]ontextual silence[] that may well be relevant to
statutory construction .... "' 0 Courts should not lightly read
into CERCLA the imposition of retroactive liability, especially
when such a provision was considered and omitted from the final
version of the bill. To do so disregards how congressional silence
at the time of CERCLA's enactment informs historical context. In
a 1983 Supreme Court case, the Court "found significance in just

" Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of
Congressionaland ConstitutionalSilence, 57 Ind L J 515, 529 (1982) (emphasis in original).
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such a congressional rejection of proposed legislation ....
0
Justice White, in his opinion for the Court in that case, stated
that "[w]hile we are correctly reluctant to draw inferences from
the failure of Congress to act, it would, in this case, appear improper for us to give a reading to the Act that Congress considered and rejected. 10 7
Congressional failure to change the language of CERCLA to
expressly approve or disapprove of retroactive liability, following
judicial interpretations requiring such retroactive liability, should
also be evaluated. Critics may suggest that congressional silence
is akin to ratification; at best, however, silence reflects indecision. Congress has numerous reasons to remain silent: there may
be dissensus among members of Congress about whether or not
retroactivity is desirable, such that Congress lacks enough momentum to either override judicial decisions or enact new legislation; Congress may prefer to stay out of a hotly contested area of
law where incremental decisionmaking on a case-by-case basis is
better than a sweeping rule of law regarding retroactive liability;
or perhaps Congress is afraid of being politically accountable for
a decision on the matter, and simply prefers to let judges take
responsibility. For courts to interpret silence decisively as ap-.
proval of retroactive liability, would be to speak where Congress
has refused to do so and to ignore the presumption against ret-roactivity.
The judiciary should be cautious in its interpretation of legis-.
lation. It should only enforce rules that have gone through the
constitutionally mandated procedure for enacting legislation in
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2.
CONCLUSION

The Olin district court opinion raised serious arguments
against the retroactive application of CERCLA that the Eleventh
Circuit did not entirely refute in their opinion reversing the district court. Debates surrounding CERCLA are not new, and
courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, continue to emphasize
different explanations for applying CERCLA retroactively. The
presence of such differing rationales suggests that Congress was
not clear in expressing its intent. The Supreme Court's 1994

,o Id at 529 n 83, citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v State Energy Resource Conservation & Development Committee, 461 US 190, 220 (1993).
107 461 US at 220.
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decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products clarified confusing
precedent regarding retroactive liability provisions and stated
that only upon evidence of clear congressional intent would it
apply statutes retroactively. l8 In light of the Landgrafholding,
courts should reconsider the retroactive application of CERCLA
liability, and should not place emphasis on the earlier cases that
relied upon pre-Landgrafanalysis. Rubber-stamping retroactivity
based upon a string cite of cases from the 1980s that impose retroactive liability, as one court did recently," is an abdication of
judicial duty. Courts should not reward legislative defaults regarding important issues such as retroactivity by construing
statutes to best achieve what the courts think the legislature
intended.
While it may both be difficult and impractical to change
CERCLA's application from a retroactive to prospective viewpoint, due to the number of persons who are in the process of
paying CERCLA response costs or who have formulated insurance contracts in light of CERCLA's retroactive interpretation by
the courts, to continue a wrong for the sake of those punished in
the past would only sacrifice the rights of innumerable parties in
the future. Furthermore, to allow retroactive liability in the face
of the Landgraf decision might lead to even more difficulties in
the future. One unintended and undesirable consequence would
be the erosion of the presumption against retroactivity, an effect
Landgrafwas designed to prevent. Congress, if it intends retroactive application, must provide clear evidence of retroactive intent
in the enactment of its legislation. To allow Congress to delegate
legislative responsibility to the courts would reward ambiguity in
statutory construction. Courts perform better when relying upon
clear congressional evidence or statements rather than clear
congressional indecision.

...511 US 244, 280 (1994).
'09 See Gould, Inc. v A & M Battery & Tire Service, 933 F Supp 431 (M 'D Pa 1996).

